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Hume's thought concerning the external world is so curious that everyone would like to deny
or attack it. But where is the best attacking point? It is not easy to find it. Reid began his
attack from a high valuation of unheared-of discovery of sensation by Berkeley and the abuse of
it. I think also that the most important of all is that Hume identified an operation of the mind
with its object under a powerful influence of Berkeley. And as to this identification, all
comentators seem to agree.
According to Hume, there are three distinct kinds of impressions. The first are those of
fi酢ire, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second are those of colours, tastes, smells and so
on. The third are bodily pains and pleasures. But all perceptions are, Hume said, the same in
the manner of their existence. That is, they are like bodily pains. SO, they are dependent beings.
But why are they dependent? Hume gave no account of it in detail. Reid did it in his ESSAYS.
He said," When I am pained, I cannot say that the pain I feel is one thing, and that my
feeling it is another thing". That is, pain has no existence, when it is not felt. It cannot exist by
itself. It is easy to understand that bodily pains are said to be dependent beings in this meaning.
But Reid said at the same time, " When I see the full moon, the full moon is one thing, my
perceiving it is another thing". Thus, there is a clear distinction between the instance of pain and
the instance of full moon. And this distinction is the same as one which is between sensation and
perception. In the former instance the operation of the mind and its object are said to be one and
the same thing, but in the latter case they are said to be two things.
According to Reid, Mr Hume's system confounds all distinctions between the operations of the
mind and their objects. What is the distinction between the case of pain and the case of full
moon? Is it a fundamental distinction? I think, it is very important for both Hume and Reid to








































































































































































































































ということであり､現に痛みが感じられないならば痛みはなかったということである｡ esse is percipiがもっと
も単純明瞭なかたちで成立している事例をわれわれはここにみる｡痛みの世界では､われわれはまさしくバークリ
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(1) Reidl, Chap.2, Sect.6, p.108.
(2) Ibid., Chap.5, Sect.7, p.127.
(3) Reid2, Essay2, Chapl, P.224. ｢混同｣という語は､リードが観念の教説を批判するさいのキー･ワードに
なっている｡これについてはp.121, 130, 224, 227, 229, 233, 277, 279, 280, 292, 294, 310, 312, 318等を
参照されたい｡














(19) Reid2, Essay 1, Chap.l, p.229.
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(37) MacNabbのいうsubstantial gapとphenomenal gapのちがいがこの場合にでてくる｡
MacNabb, p.132.
